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Criminal Law.  Whitaker v. State, 199 A.3d 1021 (R.I. 2019).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court made clear that the rule outlined in 
the United States Supreme Court case Rosemond v. United States 
does not apply retroactively. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 2006, Kendall Whitaker (Whitaker) was convicted of first 
degree murder, first degree robbery, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, carrying a handgun without a license, use of a firearm 
during the commission of a violent crime, discharging a firearm in 
the commission of a crime of violence, and committing a crime of 
violence while armed and having available a firearm.1  Prior to 
these convictions, Whitaker and two friends, Brandon Robinson 
(Robinson) and Richard Isom (Isom), attended a party at a friend’s 
apartment.2 After spending the beginning of the evening 
socializing, Whitaker and some friends went into the hallway of the 
apartment building, where Whitaker expressed his interest in 
taking Joel Jackson’s (Jackson) gold chain.3  Upon re-entering the 
party, Robinson and Jackson began to quarrel.4  At trial, Corissa 
Richardson (Richardson), also in attendance at the party, testified 
that she saw Whitaker remove a gun from his jacket and point it 
toward the scuffle.5  Isom and Robinson also testified against 
Whitaker at trial, recounting that Whitaker “drew his gun” after 
returning to the apartment.6  Shortly thereafter, three individuals 
were shot, including Jackson, who later died of his injuries.7  In 
addition, Robinson testified that he took the chain and a medallion 
1. Whitaker v. State, 199 A.3d 1021, 1024 (R.I. 2019); State v. Whitaker,
79 A.3d 795, 800 (R.I. 2013). 
2. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1024.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1024–25.
6. Id. at 1025.
7. Id.
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that Jackson had been wearing.8  Whitaker, Isom and Robinson 
were later arrested.9 
After Whitaker was convicted of the aforementioned crimes, he 
filed a direct appeal with the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the 
Court) alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s conclusion that he was guilty of aiding and abetting.10  The 
Court held that, based on the testimony of Robinson, Isom, and 
Richardson, the jury had enough support to find Whitaker guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.11 
One year later, Whitaker filed an application for post-
conviction relief, claiming that the jury was wrongly instructed 
pursuant to a newly decided United States Supreme Court case, 
Rosemond v. United States.12  Whitaker argued that in order to be 
convicted under an aiding and abetting theory, the jury must find 
that Whitaker “actively participated in the underlying violent crime 
with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a 
gun during the commission of the crime.”13  Whitaker also alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object 
to the jury instructions provided at trial.14  The hearing justice 
granted his application, finding that the decision in Rosemond 
applied to Whitaker’s case, and vacated several of his convictions.15 
The hearing justice also found that although Rosemond was decided 
after Whitaker’s conviction, it should nonetheless apply 
retroactively.16  Additionally, the trial justice held that in order to 
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. State v. Whitaker, 79 A.3d 795, 805 (R.I. 2013).  Whitaker argued that
there was insufficient evidence for him to be convicted of aiding and abetting 
because the only evidence presented involved a conspiracy count for which 
Whitaker had already been acquitted.  Id. 
11. Id. at 807.
12. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1025.  The Supreme Court held in Rosemond
that for federal charges for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation 
to any crime of violence or drug trafficking, criminal liability for that offense 
on a theory of aiding and abetting requires the government to prove that the 
defendant knew about the presence of the gun in advance and knowingly 
participated in the criminal venture with the intent to aid an armed offense. 




16. Id. at 1026.
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be convicted under an aiding and abetting theory by a 
preponderance of the evidence, Whitaker had to have known of and 
voluntarily participated in the crime; the hearing justice found he 
did not do so.17  Finally, applying the requirements laid out in 
Strickland v. Washington,18 the hearing justice found that 
Whitaker had successfully shown that his counsel’s performance 
could not “be relied on as having produced a just result.”19  The 
State petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari to review the lower 
court’s grant of Whitaker’s application for post-conviction relief, 
which the Court granted.20 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court reviewed the trial justice’s decision to grant 
Whitaker’s petition for post-conviction relief de novo, according 
“great deference” to the hearing justice’s findings of fact.21  The 
Court first addressed the State’s argument that Whitaker’s trial 
counsel was not deficient for not requesting a jury instruction based 
on the ruling in Rosemond.22  The Court found that the ruling in 
Rosemond does not apply retroactively for two reasons: (1) 
Rosemond was decided nine years after Whitaker’s trial and (2) the 
Supreme Court, in its holding, was silent on Rosemond’s retroactive 
applicability.23 Even if this rule were to apply retroactively, 
however, the Court distinguished Whitaker’s case because he was 
convicted pursuant to a Rhode Island law, where in Rosemond, a 
federal statute applied.24  As the Court explained, the state and 
federal statutes have different standards of liability for aiding and 
17. Id.
18. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).  The two
requirements used to determine whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process are: (1) evidence showing 
counsel’s performance was so deficient that counsel did not function at the level 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and, (2) evidence that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  Id. 
19. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1027.
20. Id. at 1026.
21. Id. at 1027.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1028.
24. Id. at 1029.
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abetting,25 and because Whitaker was not convicted under the 
federal statute, Rosemond did not apply.26   
Next, the court sought to determine Rosemond’s retroactive 
applicability on collateral review.  Looking to the United States 
Supreme Court case Teague v. Lane,27 where the Court held that 
new rules regarding criminal prosecutions should be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review, this Court held that the 
ruling in Rosemond was not a new rule and therefore did not apply 
retroactively.28  This Court defined a new rule as groundbreaking: 
one that “imposes new obligation[s] on the States or the Federal 
Government.”29  Because the Rosemond court based its decision on 
precedent, “it did not create a new rule that was to be retroactive to 
cases on collateral review.”30  Furthermore, the Court emphasized, 
Rosemond applied to federal, not state law, which was not at 
issue.31 
Finally, the Court reviewed whether Whitaker’s defense 
counsel was so deficient in his performance as to “undermine[] the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot 
be relied on as having produced a just result.”32  The court again 
reviewed whether Whitaker had “advance knowledge that a 
weapon was going to be used,” relying on testimony given by 
Jackson and Isom, which confirmed that Whitaker decided prior to 
attending the gathering that he would bring a gun.33  The Court 
explained that even if Rosemond applied to the case at bar, the 
conviction would nonetheless stand because the defense’s reliance 
on Rosemond was “misplaced.”34  
25. See id. at 1029–30 (discussing different standards for aiding and
abetting liability under Rhode Island law and federal law). 
26. Id. at 1028–29.
27. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
28. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1030.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1031.
31. Id. at 1029.
32. Id. at 1027.
 33.  Id. at 1031.
34. Id. at 1032.  The Court relied on the case of Jimenez v. United States,
where the court held that Rosemond would only affect the outcome of a case if 
the defendant did not carry a weapon himself.  Id. (citing Jimenez v. United 
States, 2015 WL 4507764, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2015)). 
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Whitaker’s final challenge involved his trial counsel’s “failure 
to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to charge 
Whitaker under an aiding-and-abetting theory.”35  Upon review of 
the record, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence 
to convict Whitaker in light of the testimony provided by Robinson 
and Isom.36 Accordingly, the Court held that Whitaker failed to 
show that his trial counsel was deficient by a preponderance of the 
evidence.37  
COMMENTARY 
Although the Court concluded that Rosemond does not apply 
retroactively, it nevertheless considered whether this rule would 
apply to Whitaker’s case if it was found to apply retroactively.38 
The Court described how the Rosemond rule would not apply here 
because Whitaker was convicted under state law, as opposed to 
federal law.39  Although the rule concerns federal law, the principle 
articulated in Rosemond should apply to state law as well.40  The 
fundamental principle underlying the crime of aiding and abetting 
is the same in both federal and state law. Although the rule in 
Rosemond does not apply retroactively, the Court incorrectly based 
its inapplicability on the particular crime of aiding and abetting.41 
The Court attempts to explain the reasons why Rosemond did 
not establish a new rule, basing this conclusion on the Rosemond 
Court’s reliance on precedent.42  The Supreme Court often relies on 
precedent to craft new rules; for example, in Miranda v. Arizona, 
the Court established a new rule regarding arrest procedures.43 
The Supreme Court established this new rule while relying on 
precedent cases that discussed procedural safeguards to protect an 
individual’s right against self-incrimination.44  Rosemond is no 
different—the Supreme Court clearly crafted a new rule that was 
35. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1032.
36. Id. at 1033.
37. Id. at 1032.
38. Id. at 1030.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1029.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1030.
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 503 (1966).
44. Id. at 498.
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based upon existing precedent.45  The Court sets a nearly 
impossible standard for creating a new rule: the rule must be 
“groundbreaking.”46  The Court’s reliance on this standard is 
misguided based on the reasoning in Miranda and cases like 
Miranda that articulate new legal rules despite relying on 
precedent.47 
CONCLUSION 
Here, the Court established that the United States Supreme 
Court, in its holding in Rosemond, did not intend its ruling to apply 
retroactively.  Rosemond was decided nine years after Whitaker’s 
initial trial.48  The Court highlights that when a ruling is meant to 
be held retroactively, the result will not be based on precedent, but 
establish a new rule itself. Because Rosemond was based on 
precedent, the court holds that the case does not apply retroactively 
and therefore does not apply to Whitaker’s case.   
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the United States 
Supreme Court case Rosemond v. United States did not apply 
retroactively, and in so holding, denied Whitaker’s request for post-
conviction relief. In addition, the Court found that under the United 
States Supreme Court case Strickland v. Washington, defense 
counsel was not insufficient. The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
quashed the judgment granting post-conviction relief and 
reinstated Whitaker’s full conviction from the lower court.  
Olivia Handy 
45. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1031.
 46. Id. at 1030.
47. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 503.
48. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1028.
